Administrative Appeal Decision - Lashway, Steven (2019-03-22) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
December 2020 
Administrative Appeal Decision - Lashway, Steven (2019-03-22) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad 
Recommended Citation 
"Administrative Appeal Decision - Lashway, Steven (2019-03-22) 2019-03-22" (2020). Parole Information 
Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/423 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole 
Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Lashway, Steven Facility: Fishkill CF 
NY SID: 
DIN: 17-A-1655 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
08-114-18 B 
Appearances: John Kelly Esq. 
246 East Broadway 
Monticello, New York 12701 
Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. 
Board Member(s) Crus.e, Berliner, Shapiro 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived January 18, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Btatement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Inve$tigation Report, Parole Board Report, Intervi~w Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
The Undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_. _. Vacated~ remanded for de novo interview --Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modifi~d to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's dete~mination .!!!.!!§!be annexed hereto. 
This Fin~ Detennination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ,ate fu)din~s of 
the Parole ~oard, if any, were mailed to ·the Inmate and .the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on, 3p¢/YI tf&. 
Distribution: App.eals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) . 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Lashway, Steven DIN: 17-A-1655  
Facility: Fishkill CF AC No.:  08-114-18 B 
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    Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is arbitrary and capricious, 
and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board focused on the instant offense, which is 
a matter not mentioned anywhere in the Executive Law. 2) the Board violated his due process 
constitutional liberty interest in a legitimate expectation of early release. 3) the Board ignored his 
EEC. 4) the decision ignored the wishes of the sentencing court to release him at the expiration of 
the minimum period of his sentence, thereby resentencing him. 5) the decision lacks detail. 6) the 
decision ignored his COMPAS. 7) the decision was due to bias on the part of the Board. 8)  the 
Executive Law parole statutes are unconstitutionally vague as they lack verifiable standards. 9) the 
decision was due to political pressure and public opinion against sex offenders. 
 
      Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the 
specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  
People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 
1983). Whereas here the inmate has received an EEC, the Board may deny release to parole on a 
finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the inmate will not 
live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not compatible with the 
welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 
771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1st Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 
N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992).  While 
consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).   
 
      The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
     After considering the relevant factors, the Board was allowed to place greater emphasis on the 
inmate’s criminal record including prior failures while under community supervision.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); People ex rel. Yates v. 
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Walters, 111 A.D.2d 839, 839, 490 N.Y.S.2d 573, 575 (2d Dept. 1985); People ex rel. Herbert v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (1st Dept. 1983).  
    That inmate’s prior criminal record and nature of offenses for which incarcerated resulted in 
parole denial does not reflect irrationality bordering on impropriety.  Matter of Singh v. Evans, 
118 A.D.3d 1209, 987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 
(2014). 
 
     The Board may consider an inmate’s failure to comply with DOCCS rules in denying parole.  
See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d 
Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 
960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 
A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 
343 (2012).   
    The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 
2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of 
Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter 
of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
    Credibility of an inmates explanation is to be made by the Board. The Board may consider 
matters involving the inmate’s capacity to tell the truth (eg abruptly leaving the interview early), 
and how this impacts on the statutory factors. Siao-Pao v Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 854 N.Y.S.2d 
348 (1st Dept. 2008). 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in 
parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter 
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of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d 
Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
        Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
     Receipt of an EEC does not preclude denial of parole.  Matter of Milling v. Berbary, 31 A.D.3d 
1202, 1203, 819 N.Y.S.2d 373, 374 (4th Dept.), lv. denied, 7 N.Y.3d 808, 809, 822 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(2006); Matter of Romer v. Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 867, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873 (3d Dept. 
2005); Matter of Barad v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 275 A.D.2d 856, 713 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 
(3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 96 N.Y.2d 702, 722 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2001). An EEC does not 
automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate consideration of the statutory 
factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 33 
A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Pearl v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of White v. 
Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the Board is not 
required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 
817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may deny release 
to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, the 
inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not 
compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo v. 
Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). Appellant’s receipt of an EEC did not preclude the Board from considering 
and placing greater emphasis on his criminal behavior and record on community supervision.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Bello v. Bd. of Parole, 149 A.D.3d 1458, 53 N.Y.S.3d 715 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter 
of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Berry v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 50 A.D.3d 1346, 855 N.Y.S.2d 310 (3d Dept. 2008). 
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    Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release 
was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court, Matter of 
Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. 
Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 
830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007). 
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
    The COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs 
as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory 
factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that 
the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, 
including the instant offense.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 
202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  
Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional 
consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of 
deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes 
v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017). 
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      Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason 
and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in 
reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). “[D]enial is 
neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York statute.”  
Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Only the most egregious 
official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 
2453333(SDNY 2014) citing  Boddie v New York State Division of Parole, 285 F.Supp.2d 421, 
428 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
      The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
     In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.   
     There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000).  There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision 
flowed from such bias.  Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d 
Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of 
Grune v. Board of Parole,41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007). No such evidence 
exists in this matter. Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied 
with its duty.  See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 
N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985). 
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    Appellant’s claim of political pressure is purely speculative and unsubstantiated.  Matter of 
MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 1614, 945 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 
815, 955 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2012); Matter of Huber v. Travis, 264 A.D.2d, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
1999).  
      The Board decision does not contain any bias against sex offenders. Flecha v Russi, 221 A.D.2d 
780, 634 N.Y.S.2d 225 (3d Dept 1995), leave to appeal denied 87 N.Y.2d 806, 641 N.Y.S.2d 597 
(1996). There is no merit to a claim the decision to deny parole was predetermined by an unwritten 
policy to deny parole to sex offenders.  Bush v Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d 
Dept. 2017). 
     Executive Law § 259-i is not vague and is constitutional.  MacKenzie v. Cunningham, No. 12-
CV-2452 NSR PED, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2014) (rejecting void for vagueness 
challenges); Matter of MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 945 N.Y.S.2d 471 (3d Dept. 2012) 
(same); Matter of Linares v. Stanford, Index # 1637/2016, Decision & Judgment dated 12/3/16 
(Sup. Ct. Dutchess Co.) (Pagones A.S.C.J.) (same); West v. Alexander, No. 07-CV-2098 ARR/LB, 
2009 WL 5172960, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009) (noting void for vagueness challenge dismissed 
by prior order); see also Matter of Lue-Shing v. Pataki, 301 A.D.2d 827, 754 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (3d 
Dept. 2003); Matter of Felder v. Travis, 278 A.D.2d 570, 717 N.Y.S.2d 683 (3d  Dept. 2000); 
Matter of Jerrell v. Ibsen, 253 A.D.2d 917, 677 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 1998). A vagueness 
challenge may be maintained only when no set of circumstances exists under which the law would 
be valid or in the presence of a constitutionally protected right. Dickerson v Napolitano, 604 F.3d 
732, 743-45 (2d Cir. 2010); City of Chicago v Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999); U.S. v Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). A vagueness challenge fails if the statute contains sufficient standards 
to afford a reasonable degree of certainty so that a person of ordinary intelligence is not forced to 
guess at its meaning and to safeguard against arbitrary enforcement. Morrissey v Apostol, 75 
A.D.3d 993, 996 (3d Dept. 2010). In response to being told the New York State Parole Board is 
stringent and lacks standards, the Court held there is no reason to anticipate that the petitioners will 
be denied a constitutionally proper parole hearing. Carmona v Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 414 (2d Cir. 
1978) cert. denied 439 U.S. 1091, 99 S.Ct. 874, 59 L.Ed.2d 58  (1979).The fact that Executive Law 
§259-i(2)(c)does not specify how much weight is to be accorded to each enumerated factor does 
not make the law unconstitutional. Jerrell v Ibsen, 253 A.D.2d 917, 677 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d 
Dept 1998). 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
